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Abstract Continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-independent (MDI)
quantum key distribution (QKD) is immune to imperfect detection devices,
which can eliminate all kinds of attacks on practical detectors. Here we first
propose a CV-MDI QKD scheme using unidimensional modulation (UD) in
general phase-sensitive channels. The UD CV-MDI QKD protocol is imple-
mented with the Gaussian modulation of a single quadrature of the coherent
states prepared by two legitimate senders, aiming to simplify the implemen-
tation compared with the standard, symmetrically Gaussian-modulated CV-
MDI QKD protocol. Our scheme reduces the complexity of the system since
it ignores the requirement in one of the quadrature modulations as well as the
corresponding parameter estimations. The security of our proposed scheme is
analyzed against collective attacks, and the finite-size analysis under realis-
tic conditions is taken into account. UD CV-MDI QKD shows a comparable
performance to that of its symmetrical counterpart, which will facilitate the
simplification and practical implementation of the CV-MDI QKD protocols.
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1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–6] is one of the most mature applications
in quantum information processing and quantum cryptography technology,
which guarantees the unconditional secure key distribution between two re-
mote partners, named Alice and Bob, even with the existence of a potential
eavesdropper named Eve. The unconditional security is provided by the ba-
sic physical principles of quantum mechanics [7]. Continuous-variable (CV)
QKD protocols [8–12], as counterparts of the discreet-variable (DV) proto-
cols [13–15] where key information is encoded on the properties of single pho-
tons, have emerged advantages in high secret key rates and superior compati-
bility with practical optical systems. CV-QKD protocols can be implemented
with the Gaussian modulation of the field quadratures of coherent states or
squeezed states of light [16,17]. In the last two decades, researches on CV-QKD
have gradually matured [18]. In theory, Gaussian-modulated coherent-state
(GMCS) CV-QKD protocols have been proved to be secure under collective
attacks [19,20] and coherent attacks [21,22], even with finite-size regime [23,24]
and composable security [25] taken into full analysis. Numerous experimen-
tal realizations in the laboratory [26–29] and several field tests [30–32] have
been achieved, which show the feasibility and practicability of CV-QKD proto-
cols. A recent experiment of all-fiber GMCS CV-QKD has achieved the secure
transmission distance beyond 100 km under laboratory conditions, which will
contribute to the realization of metropolitan quantum networks with conven-
tional telecom technologies [33].
Theoretically, the CV-QKD protocols with Gaussian modulation have been
proved to be unconditionally secure under some ideal assumptions. However, in
practical implementations, imperfect devices especially practical detectors may
lead to some potential loopholes [34], which will further hinder the develop-
ment of CV-QKD protocols. More recently, quantum attack strategies against
practical detection such as local oscillator (LO) fluctuation attack [35], LO
calibration attack [36], saturation attack [37] and homodyne-detector-blinding
attack [38], will seriously deteriorate the actual performance of the practical
quantum communication systems. One natural solution is to find a counterpart
to every specific loophole, while it cannot prevent an unknown attack effec-
tively and will greatly increase the complexity of physical implementation.
To effectively fill the gap between the ideal assumptions and practical imple-
mentations, measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocols were first
proposed by two groups independently [39, 40], which are immune to all side-
channel attacks against detectors. Inspired by the CV entanglement swapping,
the MDI framework was extended to CV systems later [41–43]. CV-MDI QKD
was theoretically introduced in detail with free-space experimental proofs in
Ref [41] . In most CV-MDI QKD protocols, both Alice and Bob are legitimate
senders, and they perform symmetrical Gaussian modulations on amplitude
and phase quadratures of coherent states. Then they send their quantum states
to an untrusted third party named Charlie, who performs Bell-state measure-
ment (BSM) and then communicates the results to establish a secure key.
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Since the detection is carried out by the untrusted third party, the quantum
attacks related to detectors will naturally be removed, which shows the high
practical security of CV-MDI QKD protocols. Till now, several tremendous re-
sults [44–49] have been obtained under the theoretical framework of CV-MDI
QKD, with finite-size analysis [50, 51] and composable security analysis [52]
fully accomplished.
A further simplified unidimensional modulation (UD) CV-QKD protocol
has been proposed to reduce the system complexity and the cost of the appa-
ratus [53], which thereby facilitate the commercialization of practical CVQKD
schemes. Compared to the conventional symmetrical GMCS CV-QKD proto-
cols, the asymmetrical UDCV-QKD protocols only requires the sender to use
one simple modulator to perform a single-quadrature modulation instead of
two modulators, which would even avoid to create a hole in the center of the
Gaussian probability distribution [53]. Moreover, the security analysis [54–56]
and several experimental realizations [57] were carried out to validate the fea-
sibility of UDCV-QKD protocols.
So far, in all presented CV-MDI QKD protocols [41,43], two senders both
propose a symmetrical modulation by using amplitude and phase modulators,
which causes the CV-MDI QKD protocols relatively complex. In order to re-
duce the complexity of CV-MDI QKD protocols, in this paper we extend the
idea of UD to CV-MDI QKD framework, and we firstly propose a CV-MDI
QKD protocol based on unidimensional modulation. In this renewed scheme,
both Alice and Bob use one modulator to finish the single-quadrature mod-
ulation, then they send their prepared quantum states to Charlie for BSM.
We analyze the security in a general phase-sensitive Gaussian channel under
optimal collective attacks [53]. Under the physicality constraints and rational
parameters related to unmodulated quadrature, we obtain the secret key rates
in our UD CV-MDI QKD protocol. We also take the finite-size effects into our
security analysis to obtain a tight bound under practical conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we first review the original
UD CV-QKD structure and the illustration of symmetrical modulated CV-
MDI QKD protocols. In Sect. 3, we derive the secret key rate of the UD CV-
MDI QKD protocol in asymptotic case, in comparisons with the conventional,
symmetrical modulated CV-MDI QKD protocols. The finite-size analysis is
fully taken into account in Sect. 4. Finally the conclusions and discussions are
drawn in Sect. 5.
2 CV-MDI QKD protocol with unidimensional modulation
In this section, we first review the UDCV-QKD protocol and the original
CV-MDI QKD protocol with symmetrical modulation. Then we introduce our
proposed UD CV-MDI QKD protocol with the equivalent entanglement-based
(EB) scheme presented in detail, which is more convenient and reasonable to
perform the security analysis.
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2.1 UDCV-QKD protocol and original CV-MDI QKD protocol
The schematic of UDCV-QKD protocol is displayed in Fig. 1(a). In prepare-
and-measure (PM) model, the trusted sender Alice modulates one quadrature
(amplitude quadrature xˆ or phase quadrature pˆ) of the coherent states (gener-
ated from a laser source) with modulation variance Vm by one single modulator
M and then she distributes the quantum states to the remote trusted party
Bob. Bob implements homodyne detection to detect the modulated quadra-
ture. Alice and Bob use reverse reconciliation to extract secret keys by data
post-processing method. Without loss of generality, in the rest of our paper,
we further assume that the senders modulate the amplitude quadrature xˆ. The
quantum channel is characterized as a phase-sensitive channel, with transmit-
tance ηx,p and excess noise x,p in xˆ and pˆ quadratures respectively. It should
be noted that the receiver needs to measure the other unmodulated quadrature
pˆ sometimes to acquire the necessary properties of the channel in pˆ quadrature.
In EB model, Alice measures one half mode of a two-mode squeezed vacuum
state (TMSVS) with variance V by homodyne detection, while the other half
mode is squeezed by the squeezer S and then it’s projected into a coherent
state and sent to the quantum channel [53,57] to extract a secret key.
Figure 1(b) shows the PM version of the conventional CV-MDI QKD pro-
tocol [41]. The main procedures can be briefly described in the following ways:
(1) Both Alice and Bob prepare the quantum states independently with sym-
metrical Gaussian modulation on amplitude and phase quadratures. Then the
prepared quantum states are sent to the untrusted third party Charlie through
two independent quantum links. (2) Charlie performs BSM on the incoming
modes by interfering them on a balanced beam splitter (BS). The two output
modes from BS are measured by two homodyne detectors, with the results of
Xˆ and Pˆ announced publicly. (3) Alice and Bob use the measurement results
to modify their data and then to establish a string of raw keys. (4) Alice and
Bob implement parameter estimation, information reconciliation and privacy
amplification to finally obtain a string of secret keys.
2.2 CV-MDI QKD with unidimensional modulation
In this part, we come to the implementation of CV-MDI QKD protocol with
unidimensional modulation based on its equivalent EB version as illustrated
in Fig. 2(a), for the convenience of security analysis. First we consider the
state preparation at Alice’s side, where a TMSVS with variance V is prepared
(EPR state). One mode of the EPR state is squeezed by a squeezing opera-
tion S with a squeezing parameter −log√V, while the other half mode A1 is
measured by Alice using homodyne detection. Then mode A2 is conditionally
prepared in coherent states with modulation variance Vm = V
2 − 1 and sent
to Charlie. Similarly, Bob preforms the same unidimensional modulation and
sends mode B2 to Charlie. Mode A
′ and mode B′ are interfered at a bal-
anced BS at Charlie’s side. Under the previous and agreed assumption that
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Fig. 1 (a) The prepare-and-measure (PM) model and equivalent EB model of general
UDCV-QKD protocol. (b) PM model of original CV-MDI QKD protocol. M: one single
modulator; S: squeezer; EPR: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen state; TMSVS: two-mode squeezed
vacuum state; Hom: homodyne detection; BS: beam splitter.
the single modulated quadrature is amplitude quadrature, Charlie announces
the xˆ quadrature of C publicly. After receiving the measurement results of
Charlie, Bob displaces mode B1 through displacement operation Dβ and gets
ρˆB′1 = Dβ ρˆB1D
†
β , where ρˆ represents the density matrix operator while β is
related to the gain of displacement of Charlie’s measurement results, and Alice
keeps her measured data unchanged. Finally, Alice and Bob use an authen-
ticated channel for parameter estimation, reverse reconciliation and privacy
amplification to obtain a string of secure keys.
Here are two points needed to emphasize. One point is that after Charlie’s
measurements and Bob’s displacement, mode A1 and mode B
′
1 can be treated
entangled and their data is then correlated [43]. The other point is that Alice
and Bob ought to sometimes switch Xˆ and Pˆ basis and modulate the phase
quadrature pˆ, then Charlie needs to reveal the interference results of PD of D
sometimes for both senders to gather essential channel properties in quadrature
pˆ [53, 55].
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Fig. 2 (a) The equivalent EB version of CV-MDI QKD with unidimensional modulation.
(b) Simplified equivalent one-way protocol of CV-MDI QKD protocol with unidimensional
modulation. M: one single modulator; S: squeezer; EPR: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen state;
Hom: homodyne detection; BS: beam splitter; QM: quantum memory. Dβ is displacement
operation.
3 Secret key calculation with performance analysis under
asymptotic case
3.1 Secret key calculation
In this section, we mainly carry out the secret key rate analysis under Gaussian
collective attacks for they are proved to be optimal in asymptotic case. We
derive secret key rate based on the EB scheme in Fig. 2(a). When the EPR
state at Bob’s side and the displacement Dβ are accessible to Eve, the EB
scheme in Fig. 2(a) can be conveniently equivalent to a common one-way
UDCV-QKD protocol [43] shown in Fig. 2(b). For the equivalent one-way
model requires more constraints on Eve, it is obvious the secret key rate in
Fig. 2(b) is a lower bound of that derived from Fig. 2(a). To facilitate the
calculation process with covariance matrix, we use the model in Fig. 2(b) to
obtain our KUD under collective attacks.
The CV-MDI QKD protocol has two quantum channels and there exists
two main eavesdropping strategies: one-mode attack and two-mode attack. In
practice, it’s challenging for Eve to obtain quantum correlations from both
channels due to technical constraints. In our work, we restrict our channels
to two independent Gaussian Markovian memoryless channels, where Eve can
fully implement one-mode attack. However, we should point out that Eve’s
attack assumed here is not as optimal as two-mode attack in Ref [41].
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Generally, the lower bound of the secret key rate in Fig. 2(b) under optimal
collective attack can be given as
KUD = βIA1B′1 − χE
= βIA1B′1 − (S(E)− S(E|XB′1)). (1)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, IA1B′1 is the Shannon mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob with χE the Holevo bound between Bob and
Eve, S represents the Von Neumann entropy. Since Eve could purify the whole
system after Bob performs homodyne detection, thus the mutual information
between Bob and Eve can expressed as χE = S(A1B
′
1)− S(A1|XB′1).
In our UD CV-MDI QKD protocol, we focus on the modulation of xˆ
quadrature, which results in asymmetrical covariance matrix compared with
its symmetrical Gaussian modulation CV-QKD protocol. We assume that Al-
ice and Bob use the same modulation variance Vm and the transmittance and
excess noise in Alice’s (Bob’s) channel are ηA(ηB) and A(B). In the EB
scheme in Fig. 2(b), Alice measures one mode of EPR state of variance V,
while the other half mode is squeezed with the squeezing parameter −log√V,
which results the covariance matrix as:
γA1A2 =

V 0
√
V (V 2 − 1) 0
0 V 0 −
√
V 2−1
V√
V (V 2 − 1) 0 V 2 0
0 −
√
V 2−1
V 0 1
 . (2)
Then the EB scheme is equivalent to modulate the quadrature xˆ with mod-
ulation variance Vm = V
2 − 1. After the prepared states are sent to Bob
through the quantum channel with transmittance ηx,p and excess noise x,p,
the covariance matrix γA1A2 is transformed into covariance matrix γA1B′1 in
the following form assuming perfect homodyne detection:
V 0
√
TA,x
√
V (V 2 − 1) 0
0 V 0 −
√
TA,p
√
V 2−1
V√
TA,x
√
V (V 2 − 1) 0 TA,x(V 2 − 1 + ′A,x) + 1 0
0 −
√
TA,p
√
V 2−1
V
0 1 + TA,p
′
A,p
(3)
where V =
√
Vm + 1, TA,x and 
′
x correspond to Alice’s channel estimated
parameters in xˆ quadrature, and they are given as:
TA,x =
ηA,x
2
g2, (4)
while
′A,x = 1 +
ηB,x
ηA,x
(χB,x − 1) + χA,x
+
1
ηA,x
(
√
2Vm
g
−
√
ηB(Vm + 2))
2, (5)
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with χA,x =
1−ηA,x
ηA,x
+ A,x, χB,x =
1−ηB,x
ηB,x
+ B,x, g is the gain of the dis-
placement Dβ in Bob’s side. To minimize the excess noise 
′
A,x, we choose
g2 = 2VmηB,x(Vm+2) and derive:
′A,x = A,x +
2
ηA,x
+
ηB,x
ηA,x
(B,x − 2). (6)
While TA,p and 
′
A,p is correlated with the pˆ quadrature. Theoretically,
before we derive the explicit expressions of the parameters, we have to consider
the relationship of the two unknown parameters ηA,p and A,p in pˆ quadrature.
Bounded by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to meet the requirement of
physicality, the two unknown parameters should satisfy the parabolic equation
constraint [56]:
(
√
ηA,x
(1 + ηA,xA,x)2
−√ηA,p)2 ≤ (1− ηA,x
1 + ηA,xA,x
)(1 + ηA,pA,p − 1
ηA,xA,x
).
(7)
In Fig. 3 we explore the regions bounded by physicality with a series of pa-
rameters ηA,x and A,x. The region is divided into three regions by every curve
and on the top part separated by every individual curve, it belongs to the phys-
ical region, which means the two unknown parameters can be physically set
simultaneously, otherwise the other parts will violate Heisenberg uncertainty.
In typical communication channels, one always expect the values of channel
loss and excess noise in both Xˆ and Pˆ quadratures are symmetric, and there-
fore we assume ηA,p = ηA,x (ηB,p = ηB,x) and A,p = A,x (B,p = B,x) in the
rest of our paper to carry out secret key calculation [53,54]. From Fig. 3 we can
prove our assumption strictly satisfy the physicality to perform unidimensional
modulation and now we start to calculate the secret key rate.
The Shannon mutual information between Alice and Bob IA1B′1 can be
denoted as:
IA1B′1 =
1
2
log2
VA1
VA1|XB′
1
. (8)
where VA1 is the variance of mode A1, and VA1|XB′
1
can be derived from the
matrix γA1|XB′
1
, which is calculated as [58]:
γA1|XB′
1
= γA1 − σTA1B′1(XγB′1X)
MPσA1B′1 . (9)
where X = diag(1, 0) and MP represents Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of a
matrix. γA1 , γB′1 and σA1B′1 can all derived from the decomposition of γA1B′1 .
After some algebra calculation, we can obtain
IA1B′1 =
1
2
log2
V
V − TA,xV (V 2−1)TA,x(V 2+′A,x−1)+1
. (10)
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Fig. 3 Regions bounded by physicality of the varied ηA,x and A,x. The values of these
parameters can be accessible in practice.
As we have stated before, Eve can provide a purification of the whole
system, so we can derive S(E) = S(A1B
′
1) and S(E|X ′B1) = S(A1|X ′B1).
S(A1B
′
1) can be written as a function of the symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 of
γA1B′1 , denoted as
S(A1B
′
1) = G(λ1) +G(λ2), (11)
with
G(x) =
(x+ 1)
2
log2
(x+ 1)
2
− (x− 1)
2
log2
(x− 1)
2
. (12)
Similarly, S(A1|X ′B1) can be denoted as S(A1|X ′B1) = G(λ3), where symplectic
eigenvalue λ3 can be derived from the matrix γA1|XB′
1
, considering the perfect
homodyne detection at both Alice’s and Bob’s side.
Now we have derived all the parameters to calculate secret key rate of our
UD CV-MDI QKD protocol under asymptotic case.
3.2 Performance analysis
In CV-MDI QKD protocols, there exists two different types with respect to
the position of the third party Charlie. If Charlie is in the middle of Alice
and Bob, we denote it as symmetric case (LAC = LBC), while if Charlie is
extremely close to one party, we name it as asymmetric case (LAC 6= LBC).
At first, we analyze the secret key rate as a function of modulation variance
Vm since Vm is a key parameter that will affect the performance of UD CV-
MDI QKD protocol. The illustration in symmetric case is shown in Fig. 4
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while the illustration in asymmetric case in shown in Fig. 5. From the two
curves, we can see that in both symmetric case and asymmetric case, the
large modulation could be adopted to achieve higher secret key rate, however,
when the modulation is too large, the performance is not greatly improved.
So considering the practical conditions, we choose the modulation variance
Vm = 100 (in shot noise unit N0) to calculate our secret key rate, which can
lead to optimal performance.
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Modulation variance V
m
  (units of N
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Fig. 4 Secret key rate as a function of modulation variance in symmetric case. The modu-
lation variance Vm is in shot noise unit N0. The reverse reconciliation is 0.98 [56], the excess
noise are A,x = B,x = 0.002 [44], the quantum channel loss is 0.2 dB/km. From top to
bottom, the total transmission distance (L = LAC + LBC) is 2 km, 3 km, 4 km, 5 km.
The plots in Fig. 6 show secret key rate as a function of transmission
distance in symmetric case, for both our UD CV-MDI QKD scheme and sym-
metrical Gaussian modulation CV-MDI QKD scheme. The red solid line on
the left refers to the UD CV-MDI QKD protocol with β = 0.96, the blue solid
line in the middle refers to the UD CV-MDI QKD protocol with β = 0.98. The
dashed red line on the right represents original, symmetrical Gaussian modu-
lation CV-MDI QKD protocol with β = 0.98, and the upper solid black line is
PLOB bound, which determines the ultimate limit of repeater-less quantum
communication [59]. We can see from Fig. 6 that in symmetric case, our pro-
posed UD CV-MDI QKD scheme can achieve high performance with optimal
modulation variance and the maximum transmission distance is satisfactory
compared with the symmetrical CV-MDI QKD scheme.
In the asymmetric case, the plots are drawn in Fig. 7. The red solid line on
the left refers to the UD CV-MDI QKD protocol with β = 0.96, the blued solid
line in the middle refers to the UD CV-MDI QKD with β = 0.98. The dashed
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Fig. 5 Secret key rate as a function of modulation variance in asymmetric case, where
Charlie is extremely close to Bob with a total efficiency 98%. The modulation variance Vm
is in shot noise unit N0. The reverse reconciliation is 0.98, the excess noise are A,x = B,x =
0.002, the quantum channel loss is 0.2 dB/km. From top to bottom, the total transmission
distance (LAC) is 10 km, 13 km, 16 km, 20 km, 22 km.
red line on the right refers to the original, asymmetric Gaussian modulation
CV-MDI QKD with β = 0.98. The PLOB bound is plotted in the solid black
line. We could get from the curve that all the plots are strictly under the
PLOB bound.
From Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, we can conclude that UD CV-MDI QKD in asym-
metric case is superior to UD CV-MDI QKD in symmetric case, which has
been proved in all the previous CV-MDI QKD schemes. In our proposed
UD CV-MDI QKD protocols in both cases, the performance of our protocol
is comparable to its corresponding original symmetric Gaussian modulation
CV-MDI QKD protocol, while our protocols reduce the system complexity
and simplify the implementation with more standard devices. In addition, UD
CV-MDI QKD protocol is sensitive to reverse reconciliation efficiency espe-
cially in asymmetric case and it’s reasonable for us to adopt more efficient
reconciliation algorithms.
4 Finite-size analysis in UD CV-MDI QKD protocol
In the practical implementation of any CV-MDI QKD protocol, the two legit-
imate parties can only exchange a finite-size block of data and sacrifice part of
the data for parameter estimation [24,60]. To fill the gap between the protocol
in asymptotic case and the protocol under practical conditions, we analyze the
finite-size effects on our proposed UD CV-MDI QKD protocol in this section.
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Fig. 6 Secret key rate as a function of transmission distance in symmetric case. From left
to right, the red solid line represents UD CV-MDI QKD protocol with reverse reconciliation
efficiency 96%, the blue solid line represents UD CV-MDI QKD protocol with reverse recon-
ciliation efficiency 98%, while the dashed red line represents original, symmetrical Gaussian
modulation CV-MDI QKD protocol with 98% efficiency. The upper solid black line is the
PLOB bound. The modulation variance Vm is 100, the excess noise are A,x = B,x = 0.002,
the quantum channel loss is 0.2 dB/km.
As all the finite-size regime did, we mainly focus on channel transmittance
and excess noise within confidence intervals. To minimize the secret key rate
of our protocol, we acquire the lower transmission and higher excess noise.
The secret key rate in the finite-size scenario can be expressed as:
KfUD =
n
N
[βIA1B′1 − SPE (XB′1 , E)−∆(n)]. (13)
where N is the total number of signals exchanged between Alice and Bob, n
is the number of signals used to generate secret key. The m = N − n signals
are used for parameter estimation. ∆(n) is the correction term related to the
security of privacy amplification and has the expression
∆(n) = 7
√
log2(2/˜)
n
+
2
n
log2(1/PA). (14)
with PA and ˜ the failure probability and the smoothing parameter. Their
optimal values can be conservatively set as PA = ˜ = 10
−10. IA1B′1 is the
mutual information of Alice and Bob, SPE (XB′1 , E) is defined as the maximum
entropy of Eve and Bob under certain failure probability PE .
Now we come to the parameter estimation procedure and focus mainly on
excess noise and transmittance. In practice, the estimation is sampled from m
pairs of correlated variables (xi, pi)i=1...m. Since the channel between Alice and
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 13
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Fig. 7 Secret key rate as a function of transmission distance in asymmetric case. where
Charlie is set extremely close to Bob with an overall efficiency 98%. From left to right, the
red solid line represents UD CV-MDI QKD with reverse reconciliation efficiency 96%, the
blue solid line represents UD CV-MDI QKD protocol with reverse reconciliation efficiency
98%, while the dashed red line represents original, symmetrical Gaussian modulation CV-
MDI QKD protocol with 98% efficiency. The upper solid black line is the PLOB bound.
The modulation variance Vm is 100, the excess noise are A,x = B,x = 0.002, the quantum
channel loss is 0.2 dB/km.
Charlie, the channel between Bob and Charlie can be seen as normal linear
models following Gaussian distribution. Within this model, before the BS,
Alice’s and Charlie’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s data can be linked in the following
relation:
y′1 = t
′
1x1 + z1, (15)
y′2 = t
′
2x2 + z2, (16)
where t′1 =
√
ηA,x, t
′
1 =
√
ηB,x. z1 and z2 follow a centered normal distribution
with unknown variance σ′21 = 1+ηA,xA,x and σ
′2
2 = 1+ηB,xB,x. According to
the entries of the covariance matrix, the variance of the unknown parameters
before the BS can be given as:
〈y′21 〉 = t′21 Vm + σ′21 , (17)
〈y′22 〉 = t′22 Vm + σ′22 . (18)
Estimators tˆ′21 , tˆ
′2
2 , σˆ
′2
1 and σˆ
′2
2 in maximum-likelihood analysis under the nor-
mal linear model can be expressed as:
tˆ′1 =
∑m
i=1 x1iy
′
1i∑m
i=1 x
2
1i
,
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tˆ′2 =
∑m
i=1 x2iy
′
2i∑m
i=1 x
2
2i
. (19)
σˆ′21 =
1
m
m∑
1
(y′1i − tˆ′1x1i),
σˆ′22 =
1
m
m∑
1
(y′2i − tˆ′2x2i). (20)
The independent estimators tˆ′1, tˆ
′
2, σˆ
′2
1 and σˆ
′2
2 follow the distribution below:
tˆ′1 ∼ N(t′1,
σ′21∑m
i=1 x
2
1i
), tˆ′2 ∼ N(t′2,
σ′22∑m
i=1 x
2
2i
). (21)
mσ′21
σ′21
,
mσ′22
σ′22
∼ χ2(m− 1). (22)
where t′1, t
′
2, σ
′2
1 and σ
′2
2 are the true values of the parameters. The confidence
interval of these parameters can be estimated with the except probability
PE/2 due to the limit of m as:
t′1 ∈ [t′1 −∆t′1, t′1 +∆t′1],
t′2 ∈ [t′2 −∆t′2, t′2 +∆t′2],
σ′21 ∈ [σ′21 −∆σ′21 , σ′21 +∆σ′21 ],
σ′22 ∈ [σ′22 −∆σ′22 , σ′22 +∆σ′22 ]. (23)
where
∆t′1 = zPE/2
√
σˆ′21
mVm
, ∆t′2 = zPE/2
√
σˆ′22
mVm
, (24)
∆σ′21 = zPE/2
σ′21√
m
2
, ∆σ′22 = zPE/2
σ′22√
m
2
. (25)
where zPE/2 is around 6.5 when the σPE is generally taken as 10
−10 [23, 24].
Now we can estimate minimum ηA,x = tˆ
′2
1 , ηB,x = tˆ
′2
2 and maximum A,x =
σˆ′21 −1
tˆ′21
, B,x =
σˆ′22 −1
tˆ′22
using the previous confidence intervals and calculation
results. After Charlie has finished the measurements, we can further estimate
the parameters in covariance matrix γA1B′1 as:
TA,x =
ηA,x
2
g2, TB,x =
ηB,x
2
g2, (26)
′A,x = A,x +
2
ηA,x
+
ηB,x
ηA,x
(B,x − 2). (27)
where we select g2 = 2VmηB,x(Vm+2) . As the parameters are all derived from the
above part, now we can analyze the finite-size effects.
Figure. 8 and Fig. 9 demonstrate the secret key rate as a function of trans-
mission distance in the symmetric case and asymmetric case considering the
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finite-size effects. The data length n to generate the secret key is half of the
total block length. Simulation results show that the finite-size effects will sig-
nificantly influence the performance of our proposed UD CV-MDI QKD pro-
tocol with a rather small amount of data exchanged. As the number of the
exchanged data increases, the performance will gradually approach the cor-
responding asymptotic case. In addition, the scheme is robust against the
finite-size effect with the block length larger than 109. In both curves, the
PLOB bound is plotted and the results are strictly under the PLOB bound
region. To better perform UD CV-QKD protocol, it’s essential to exchange a
sufficient number of block data.
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Fig. 8 Secret key rate as a function of transmission distance in symmetric case considering
finite-size effects. From left to right, the block length is equal to 106, 107, 108, 109 and
infinite. The upper solid black line is the PLOB bound. The modulation variance Vm is 100,
β = 0.98, the excess noise are A,x = B,x = 0.002, the quantum channel loss is 0.2 dB/km.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have firstly introduced a CV-MDI QKD scheme with unidi-
mensional modulation based on the Gaussian modulation of a single quadra-
ture of the coherent lights, which will greatly reduce the implementation com-
plexity and allow more standard devices, as well we illustrate the physicality of
the other unmodulated quadrature. Moreover, we investigate the finite-size ef-
fects under practical conditions to fill the gap between the asymptotic case and
the practical case and we found that our protocol is robust to finite-size effects
with large block data length (larger than 109). Overall, our simulation results
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Fig. 9 Secret key rate as a function of transmission distance in asymmetric case considering
finite-size effects. Where Charlie is set extremely close to Bob with an overall efficiency 0.98.
From left to right, the block length is equal to 106, 107, 108, 109 and infinite. The other
parameters are the same as Fig. 8.
under accessible parameters show that compared with the original, symmetric
Gaussian modulation protocol, our UD CV-MDI QKD protocol is still com-
parable to its counterpart with acceptable secret key rate and considerable
system simplification.
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